RECENT CASES.

COPYRIGHT.
Perforated rolls, which, when used in connection with
mechanical piano players, reproduce in sound copyrighted
musical compositions, do not infringe the copynmpiuas: right in such compositions. White-Smith Music
Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., U. S. Adv. Sheets, March
Perforated
6, 1908, p. 319.
Rolls
Justice Day said: "These perforated rolls are parts of a
machine, which, when duly applied and properly operated in
connection with the mechanism to which they are adapted,
produce musical tones in harmonious production. But we
cannot think they are copies within the copyright act." Kennedy v. McTamnzany, 33 Fed. 584.
In a similar case relative to phonograph discs, the Court
said: "it is not pretended that the marks upon the wax cylinders can be made out by the eye or that they can be utilized
in any other way than as parts of the mechanism of the phonogiaph." Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. Div. (D. C.) 562.
The question came squarely before the English court in
Bosey v. JI'right (1899) x Ch. 836, and it was there held that
the perforated rolls did not infringe the Eniglish Copyright Act
protecting sheet music. The Court based their decision upon
the ground that "the rolls are intended merely for causation
and not for indication of the music."
Justice Htolmes, in concurring specially, pointed out the
evident injustice of the decision, made necessary by the
.tatute. lie said, "One would expect the protection to be coextensive, not only with the invention, which, though free to
all, only one had the ability to achieve, but with the possibility
of r producing the results which gives to the invention its
meaning and worth. On principle anything that mechanically
rt-procuces that col!ocation of sounds ought to be held a copy,
or if the statute be too narrow, ought to be made so by
further act, except so far as sonic extraneous consideration of
policy may oppose."
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CRIMINAL LAW.
Defendant by his false representations that certain land was
worth $ii,ooo, induced the prosecutor to pay him that sum in
a sale of the land. The land, it was alleged, was
Palso
worth only $33o. Defendant was indicted for
Preteno:
false pretence, and at the trial evidence was given
Value
that he knew the land was not worth $iIooo. Held, when a
statement as to value is made as an existing fact, and when
the speaker knows it to be false and intends it to be an inducement to the other party, it becomes a false representation of a
material fact. And whether it was intended as an expression
of opinion or as a fact, is to be determined by the jury.
Supreme Court of Ohio, 83 N. E. 802.
The same rule "vas applied in the recent case of Crandall v.
Parks, 93 Pac. ioi8, which was an action to rescind a contract
on the ground of fraud.

GUARANTY.
A executed a guaranty upon an order for goods from B,
which contained a condition that the order should not be a
binding contract until approved by B. The order
and guaranty were delivered to B's agent. B
Acceptanc
approved the order and shipped the goods, but no
notice of the acceptance of the guaranty was given to A. B
sues A on the guaranty. Judgment was" given for A on the
ground that notice of the acceptance of the guaranty is necessary to bind the guarantor. Smith Co. v. Thesmann, 93 Pac.
977 (Oklahoma).
This'folltws the rule laid clown by the Supreme Court of
the United States in Davis Co. v. Richards, iir U. S. 524.
that mere perfornance of the offer of guaranty does not complete the contract.
In Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass. 5oo, it is said that acting on
the guaranty completes the contract, but the acceptor must
notify the guarantor within a reasonable time after the perfornance. This duty, however, is performed by the mailing
of the letter giving notice, though it never reaches the guarantor. But see Lennox v. Murphy, 171 Mass. 370.
This rule of notice, which seems to be limited to cases of
guaranties, has been adversely criticised. See Hlare on Contracts, 320.
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HOMICIDE.
The following charge was requested by the defendant and
refused by the Court: "The Court charges the jury that one
of tle ingredients of murder in the second degree
Trial:
Instructions:
is willfulness and malice aforethought, and unless
the jury believe beyond all reasonable doubt that
Requests
the deceased caine to his death by blows inflicted upon him
by the ,Iefendant intentionally and with malice aforethought
they cannot find him guilty of murder in the second degree."
Held, the trial Court did not err in refusing the charge; "that
it was misleading, for the use of the word 'aforethought' as
applied to murder in the second degree." Smith v. State, 45
South. Rep. 626.
An authority in support of the conclusion in the principal
case is Vilson v. State, 128 Ala. 17, in which it was said: "A
tern giving rise to views so divergent would probably have .
confused the jury and misled them to believe that premeditation was a necessary ingredient of murder in the second
degree, whereas malice which may arise on the instant and
without deliberation, when concurring with an intention to
kill, may constitute that offense."
Both authority and principle seem to be contra to this decision, however. "The word 'aforethought' does not necessarily
require either delberation or premeditation." Bishop on Criminal Law. "To bring a killing within the provision 'deliberate
anti premeditated,' it must be such as would be murder at the
common law, 6therwise expressed it must be of 'malice aforethought;' added to which, it must be 'deliberate and premeditated.'" Smith v. S., 68 Ala. 424. "The malice which is an
essential element in the offense of murder, has always been
described as malice aforethought." Ethridge v. State, 141 Ala.
29; Fields v. State, 52 Ala. 348.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.
In a building contract, it was specified that no instalment
should exceed seventy-five per cent. of the cost of materials
delivered for the work. The contractor fraudulently substituted materials inferior to those
,
Obtainedby
named in the contract, and by collusion with the
Fratud
of
Prnlcipa

engineer of the one for whom he was building,

instalments were made exceeding seventy-five per
cent. of the cost of materials actually furnished but not ex-
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PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (Continued).
ceeding seventy-five per cent. of the materials pretended to be
furnished. Held, that the claim of the contractor's surety to
be discharged on the ground that the "creditor had failed to
maintain the reserve stipulated for by the contract until the
work was completed, was not sound. Van Buren County v.
American Surety Co., ii5 N. W. 2-t. It is generally held that
where, by the terms of the contract, the principal is to be paid
in instalments, and he is paid faster than the contract provides,
a surety for the completion of the work to be performed by the
principal is discharged. Calvert v. Dock Co., 2 Keen 638. One
court has held, where the principal by fraud obtained money
not due from the creditor, that the surety is discharged, Goodin
v. Ohio, i8 Ohio Rep. 6; but the better rule seems to be that
under such circumstances the surety is not discharged even
though the negligefice of the creditor's agent made the principal's fraud easier of accomplishment. Ryan v. U. S., 22
U. S. Supr. Ct. Rep. (L. Ed.) 172.

PAYMENT.
Where a debtor executes his note, governed by the law merchant, for a pre-existing debt, such note is only a prima facie
presumption of payment of the debt; but where
Pre.E Istlng
this presumption of payment deprives'the party
Debt:x

Promiory
Note:
Prenumptton

accepting it of collateral security or some other
substantial benefit, such circumstance rebuts the

presumption of payment. This rule is the s.ame
where the debtor, at the instance of the creditor, executes his
note to a third person. Beach v. Huntsman, 83 N. E. (Ind.)
1033.

This rule of law that the giving of a promissory note by a
debtor to the creditor or to a third person, at the request of the
creditor, is prima facie payment of the pre-existing debt obtains
in the jurisdiction of Massachusetts, Maine. Vermont, Indiana
and Louisiana. Paddock v. Simmons, 186 Mass. 152; Kridcr
v. Knox, 48 Me. 551 ; Dickenson v. King, 28 Vt. 378; Hunt v.
Boyd, 2 La. og.
In all jurisdictions, except as above, a promissory note
given by the debtor to the creditor or to a third person at his
request does not raise a presumption of payment of the preexisting debt, but is governed by the agreement of the parties.
Owen v. Morse, 7 T. R. 66; Price v. Price, 16 M. & W. 24o;
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Sweet v. Jones, 2 R. I. 292; Mooring v. Mobile, 27 Ala. 256.
Bank v. Daniels, 12 Pet. 32; Phila. v. Stewart, 195 Pa. 314.
Hut, unless otherwi.,e agreed, it does raise a presumption of
conditional payment which merges the debt in the note and
sn.;penls all right of action on the debt during the running of
the note. Ward v. Evans, 2 L. Raymond 928; 2 Ames Bills and
Notes 571 ; Kilpatrick v. Association, i 19 Pa. 36; Hunelstown
v. Kncrr, 25 Pa. Sup. 467.

SALES.
A purchased an automobile from C, giving a note and
extingui.ihing an old debt in payment. He allowed it to remain
in C's possession, and permitted C to use the same
Faudulent
in consideration of its storage in C's garage. Subconveyace:
sequently, C mortgaged the machine to B, who
Retention ot
Posseslon by
took possession of it. In an action of replevin A
vendor
was permitted to recover, and it was held that
whether the retention of possession by the vendor was fraudulent upon the subsequent mortgagee was a question for the.
jury. Wilson v. Walrath, xi5 No. West. 2o3 (Minn).
Whether retention of possession by the vendor after a sale
is fraudulent upon a subsequent innocent vendee for value,
appears to have been first dealt with in Twyne's Case, 5 Eng.
Rul. Cas. 21, interpreting St. 13 Eliz. C. 5 and St. 27 Eliz, C.
7. It was there ruled in point of law to be fraudulent. The
English court, after considerable shifting, has finally determined it to be merely presumptive of fraud, which may be
rebutted. Cookson v. Swire, 9 App. Cas. 653.
The American cases have, either under statute or common
law, taken three views: First in following the early English
view, Step,.en v. Gifford, 137 Pa. 219; secondly, holding it a
presumption of law which may Ve rebutted, Hobbs v. Bibb, 2
Stew. 54; thirdly, that the retention is only prinma fade evidence
of fraud, and is a question for the jury. The majority of
States, together with the Federal courts, have adopted 'the
third view, Aioh ton v. Robinson, 40 Mich. 2oo; Warner v.
Norton, 20 flow. 46o. The principal case which is an interpretatior. of a State statute, is in accord with this majority
view which represents the modern tendency.
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WATER COURSES.
A canal company, under a franchise from the State, constructed a cross-canal, which drained a lowland in an artificial
the
course. B built upon the land relying upon
Removalof
new flowage. After forty years A, who was then
Artificial
owner of the canal, obstructed the cross-canal
thus throwing back the water to its original drainage, and
thereby flooding B's land. Held, that A could not be restrained from obstructing the cross-canal and establishing the
original flow. Lake Drummond Canal and Water Co. v. Durnham, et al., 6o So. East. Rep. 65o (N. Co.).
The question whether one may return to its true course a
stream, which has been controlled by an artificial device for
the prescriptive period, has frequently come before the courts.
Almost uniformly the answer has been in the negative. The
reasons assigned are: First, the one against whom the right
to divert has been acquired, has himself gained a prescriptive
right to insist that the new course be maintained, Mathewson
v. Hoffman, 77 Mlich., 420; secondly, it is a species of dedication to the public use, Ford v. Whitlack, 27 Vt. 265; and
thirdly, where a change has been made which presents the
appearance of pe-anincy, the doctrine of estoppel vill prevent a stream being reve*rted to its ancient course to the injury
of one who has been induced to act upon such appearances,
Smith v. Musgrove, 32 AMo. App. 241.
The objection to the first reason is that the user of him
against whom the right to divert has been acquired, cannot be
called adverse; to the second that dedication must be to the
public, while here it is simply to the individuals who happen to
be within the radius of the change in flow. Farnham on Water
and Waters, p. 233!.
The third reason, while perhaps the best, admits of much
judicial discretion in determining what change exhibits sufficient permanency. In ihe present case a user of forty years
was held only temporary. It might very well, with more justice
and accordance with authority, have been held contra. Withers
v. Purchase, 6o L. T. N. S. 819; Belknap v. Trimble, 3 Paige
577.

